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Abstract
An experimenter seeks to learn a subject’s preference relation. The experimenter
produces pairs of alternatives. For each pair, the subject is asked to choose. We ar-
gue that, in general, large but finite data do not give close approximations of the sub-
ject’s preference, even when countably infinite many data points are enough to infer the
preference perfectly. We then provide sufficient conditions on the set of alternatives,
preferences, and sequences of pairs so that the observation of finitely many choices al-
lows the experimenter to learn the subject’s preference with arbitrary precision. The
sufficient conditions are strong, but encompass many situations of interest. And while
preferences are approximated, we show that it is harder to identify utility functions. We
illustrate our results with several examples, including expected utility, and preferences
in the Anscombe-Aumann model.
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1 Introduction
Consider a subject who forms a preference over the objects, or alternatives, of some
collection X. The subject participates in an experiment, in which he is presented with a
sequence of pairs of alternatives. For each pair, the subject is asked to choose one of the
two alternatives offered. What can an experimenter learn about the subject’s preference
from observing these binary comparisons? Suppose that, after every observation, the
experimenter computes an estimate of the subject’s preference consistent with the data
observed up that point: the experimenter chooses a preference rationalizing the choices
made by the subject in the experiment. Is the estimate a good approximation of the
subject’s underlying preference, for a large but finite experiment?
In this paper, depending on the setup, we provide positive and negative answers to
these questions. We investigate the asymptotic behavior of preference estimates from
finite experiments. It is a question of preference identification, in the classical sense of
the term. We ask if one can fully identify the preference of a subject at the limit with
finite data.1
To illustrate the key issues, consider the following simple example. Let X ⊆ Rn
represent a set of consumption bundles. The subject has a preference, denoted ∗, over
∗Echenique thanks the National Science Foundation for its support through the grants SES 1558757
and CNS 1518941. Lambert gratefully acknowledges the financial support and hospitality of Microsoft
Research New York and the Cowles Foundation at Yale University.
1Standard decision-theoretic language reserves the term identified for a relation between preference
and utility. In that context, a model is identified if every preference relation is represented by a unique
(up to some class of transformations) set of parameters. Thus, identification in this sense requires the
knowledge of an entire preference relation. In this paper, we do not assume knowledge of the entire
preference relation. Instead, we ask if one can learn the entire preference relation with a possibly large,
but nonetheless finite data set.
the elements of X. Over time, the subject is presented with a choice from a set Bk =
{xk, yk}. Together, the sets B1, B2, . . . , Bk form a finite experiment. The experimenter
observes the subject’s choice of bundle for every pair. Assume the choice is consistent
with the subject’s preference, so that if x is chosen over y, then x ∗ y. Note that we
can only, at best, infer the preference of the subject on the set B ≡ ∪∞k=1Bk. Thus, if
the subject’s preference behaves very differently outside of the set B, there is no hope
to obtain a fine approximation of the subject’s preference over the entire set X. Two
natural conditions emerge. First, we require that ∗ be continuous, so one can hope to
approximate the preference from finitely many samples. Second, we require that the set
B is dense in X, so that the observations are sufficiently spread out. And indeed, we
show that, under these conditions, if one can observe the preference of the subject over
the whole set B, then one can infer precisely ∗ on X.
The two conditions, continuity of ∗ and denseness of B, are, however, not enough
to provide good approximations of ∗ from finitely many observations. Knowledge of
the preference over the infinite set B allows the experimenter to exploit the continuity
assumption on the subject’s preference. With finite data, continuity does not have enough
bite. For example, let X = [0, 1]. Suppose that the preference of the subject over X is
captured by the binary relation ≥ (greater numbers are always chosen). Consider the
countable set of objects B = Q∩(0, 1), and B1, B2, . . . an enumeration of pairs of objects
of B. Then any continuous preference that agrees with ≥ on Q has 1 weakly preferred
to 0. However, for any n, one can find a preference n that rationalizes the choices of
the subject over B1, . . . , Bn, and yet that ranks 0 strictly above 1.
More generally, we demonstrate in Proposition 3 that one can come up with an even
more startling example: no matter the subject’s preference, the experimenter may end
up inferring that the subject is indifferent among all alternatives. And yet, as in the
example just described, she would be able to infer the subject’s preference perfectly, had
she access to the subject’s preference over the infinite set B all at once. The example
exhibits a kind of discontinuity. With infinite data in the form of B we must conclude
that x  y, but any finite data cannot rule out that y  x.
Our examples illustrate the dangers of data-driven estimation. Non-parametric esti-
mation with finite data can behave very differently from estimation with infinite (even
countable) data. To derive meaningful estimates, one must construct a theory that disci-
plines the preferences, and lays down the proper conditions for convergence of preference
estimates.
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We include three sets of results.
Our first and foremost results concern non-parametric estimation. We offer fairly
general conditions so that observing sufficiently many binary choices allows one to ap-
proximate the subject’s preference arbitrarily closely with any preference that rationalizes
the finite data.
We provide two notions of rationalization, a weak and a strong one. Under strong
rationalization, a rationalizing preference must reflect choices perfectly. So if one alterna-
tive is chosen over another, the preference must rank the first strictly above the second.
Under weak rationalization, the first alternative must only be ranked at least as good as
the second. Weak alternatives reflect the phenomenon of partial observability (Chambers
et al. (2014)) whereby one cannot infer anything from a choice that was not made.
Under both notions of rationalization, we must impose some structure on the en-
vironment and on the rationalizing preferences so as to avoid the negative results de-
scribed above. Importantly, we need a notion of objective rationality expressed by the
monotonicity of preferences. We postulate an exogenous partial ordering of the set of
alternatives—for example, standard vector dominance when the set of alternatives rep-
resents consumption bundles, or stochastic dominance when it is the set of lotteries over
monetary amounts—and we require that the subject’s preference is monotonic with re-
spect to that exogenous order.
With the added structure, finite-experiment rationalizable preferences converge to
the subjects underlying preference. Somewhat stronger conditions are needed to obtain
the result for weak rationalization (conditions that hold for preferences over Euclidean
spaces, but rule out some common applications in decision theory), yet it is remarkable
that convergence is at all attained for weak rationalization. We are after all inferring a
lot less about the subject’s preferences when we use weak, instead of strong, rational-
ization. Convergence is obtained for strong rationalizations under conditions that are
consistent with most applications in decision theory, and with probably all experimental
implementations of decision theoretic models.
The proposed results are general and relevant to a wide range of contexts. For con-
creteness, we illustrate their application to the special case of preferences over lotteries,
dated rewards, consumption bundles, and Anscombe-Aumann acts (Anscombe and Au-
mann, 1963). In all these cases there is a natural objective partial order, and monotonicity
seems to us as a very reasonable imposition. There are other environments in which one
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cannot reasonably impose any kind of monotonicity. For instance, in the literature on
discrete allocation (Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979) for example; or the recent literature
on school choice) in which agents are assumed to choose among lotteries over finitely
many heterogeneous objects, monotonicity would require that all agents agree on a rank-
ing of the underlying objects. There are also some more subtle technical issues, even
when the meaning of monotonicity is clear. We can deal with preferences on Rn, and
with preferences on lotteries over R, but not with preferences over lotteries over Rn.
Our second set of results concern the identification of utility functions. Given a utility
representation for the agent’s preference, we show that it is possible to carefully select
finite-data utility rationalizations so as to approximate the subject’s utility arbitrarily
closely. This result again rests on monotonicity assumptions (but of a somewhat dif-
ferent nature, see Section 5). There is a clear difference between estimating preferences
and utilities. Any preference estimate converges to the true underlying preference. For
utilities we only know that a certain selection converges. This observation is important
because one may want to estimate utilities of a certain functional form. There is no
guarantee that such utility estimates have the correct asymptotic behavior: only that
the preferences that they represent do.
Our third and final results concern the identification of preferences with infinite but
countable data. We show that, when the experimenter has access to the preference of the
subject over all alternatives of a countable set, then it is possible to recover perfectly the
subject’s preference over the entire set of alternatives X under much weaker conditions
than above. We further demonstrate that, under such conditions, the experimenter can,
in theory, obtain the subject’s preference directly from the observation of a single choice
of the subject when the subject is asked to select an object among a large, infinite set.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. After reviewing the literature, we
describe the model in Section 2. In Section 3, we discuss the special case of Anscombe-
Aumann preferences. We provide our main results on non-parametric preferences with
finite data in Section 4. In Section 5, we discuss the convergence of utility estimates. We
deal with preference identification with infinite but countable data in Section 7. Finally,
in Section 8, we discuss interpretations of preference relations. We relegate the proofs and
more technical results (some of which may be of independent interest) in the Appendix.
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Literature Review
Experimentalists and decision theorists have an obvious interest in preference estimation,
but we are not aware of any study of the behavior of preference estimates from finite
experiments. The long tradition of revealed preference theory from finite data (starting
from Afriat (1967)) is focused on testing, not estimation. The closest study to ours
seems to be the paper by Mas-Colell (1978), working with finite observations from a
demand function over a finite number of goods. Mas-Colell assumes a rational demand
function that satisfies a boundary condition and is “income Lipschitzian.” He assumes a
sufficiently rich sequence of observations, taken from an increasing sequence of budgets.
Then he shows that the sequence of rationalizing preferences, each rationalizing a finite
(but increasing) set of observations, converges to the unique preference that rationalizes
the demand function.
There are many differences between Mas-Colell’s exercise and ours, even if one re-
stricts attention to choice over bundles of finitely-many, divisible, consumption goods. In
particular, the difference in model primitives—demand instead of binary comparisons—
is crucial. One cannot generally use choice from linear budgets to recreate any given
binary comparison. Moreover, there is no property analogous to the boundary and Lip-
schitz continuity of demand in our framework. Indeed, as shown in Mas-Colell (1977),
by means of an example due to L. Shapley, without these properties, preferences are
not identified from demand.2 In Mas-Colell’s work, weak and strong rationalizability
coincide, as he works with demand functions. We are particularly interested in partial
observability.
Also with demand primitives, the recent papers by Reny (2015), Kubler and Polemar-
chakis (2015) and Polemarchakis et al. (2017) provide results on the limiting behavior of
finite-data utility rationalizations. These papers focus on the convergence of certain util-
ity constructions that rationalize finite demand data. Our work is closer to Mas-Colell’s,
in that our main results are about the convergence of (any) rationalizing preferences. Of
course there are also important differences in the primitives assumed in our paper and
in the demand-theory papers.
The topology on preferences was introduced by Hildenbrand (1970) and Kannai
2Shapley’s example also appears in Rader (1972). The example poses no problem for identification in
our framework of binary comparisons. It generates non-identification of demand because two preferences
have the same marginal rate of substitution at the sampled points. With binary comparisons, the
differences between two such preferences are detected.
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(1970), building on the work of Debreu (1954). In our study of the mapping from utility
to preference, we borrow ideas from Mas-Colell (1974) and Border and Segal (1994).
In particular, the proof of the continuity of the “certainty equivalent” representation is
analogous to Mas-Colell’s, and we take the notion of local strictness from Border and
Segal, as well as their continuity result (see Theorem 20).
2 Model
2.1 Notational conventions
If x, y ∈ Rn, then x ≥ y means that xi ≥ yi for i = 1, . . . , n; and x > y that x ≥ y and
x 6= y. We write x y when xi > yi for i = 1, . . . , n. The interval [a, b] denotes the set
{z ∈ Rn : b ≥ z ≥ a}. An open interval (a, b) denotes the set {z ∈ Rn : b z  a}.
If A ⊆ R is a Borel set, we write ∆(A) for the set of all Borel probability measures on
A. For x, y ∈ ∆(A), we write x ≥FOSD y when x is larger than on y in the sense of first
order stochastic dominance (meaning that
∫
A
fdx ≥ ∫
A
fdy for all monotone increasing,
continuous and bounded functions f on A).
Let X be a set. Given a binary relation B ⊆ X×X, we write x B y when (x, y) ∈ B.
And we say that a function u : X → R represents B if x B y iff u(x) ≥ u(y).
2.2 The model
There is an experimenter (a female) and a subject (a male). The subject chooses among
alternatives in a set X of possible alternatives. We assume that X is a Polish and locally
compact topological space. For example, the elements of X could consist of lotteries,
consumption bundles, state-contingent payments, or state-contingent lotteries (so-called
Anscombe-Aumann acts).
A preference, or preference relation, is any binary relation over X. A preference
 is continuous if ⊆ X × X is closed. Unless otherwise specified, we assume that
all preferences in this paper are complete, transitive, and continuous. In other words,
they are closed weak orders, or weak orders for which the sets {y ∈ X : y  x} and
{y ∈ X : x  y} are closed for all x ∈ X, see, e.g., Bergstrom et al. (1976).
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The subject in question has a preference ∗ over X that the experimenter is trying
to infer through a sequence of experiments. The experimenter designs an increasing
sequence of finite experiments, whose purpose is to learn the subject’s preference, ∗,
in the limit. In each experiment, the subject is presented with finitely many unordered
pairs of alternatives drawn from X. For every pair {x, y}, the subject is asked to choose
one of the two alternatives x or y. Continuity of the subject’s preferences makes it viable
to derive good approximations of the preference despite only having finite data. The
problem of inferring a non-continuous preference from finite data is hopeless.
Let Σ∞ = {Bi}i∈N be the set of all pairs to be used across these experiments. Every
Bi = {xi, yi} is a subset of X of cardinality two. Enumerating the experiments k =
1, 2, . . . , the set of pairs of the k-th experiment is denoted Σk, and it is assumed that Σk =
{B1, . . . , Bk}; in other words, experiments are increasing in that the k-th experiment
includes the (k − 1)-th experiment. In the sequel, experiments are described in terms of
their set of pairs Σk. Let B = ∪∞k=1Bk be the set of all alternatives that are used over all
the experiments.
We make two assumptions on these experiments. First, we assume that the experi-
menter can eventually learn the subject’s preference over any finite subset of B; specifi-
cally, we assume that all subsets of B of cardinality two are in Σ∞. Second, we assume
that B is dense in X. The denseness assumption is substantial, but unavoidable given our
focus on nonparametric estimation. The purpose of the assumption is to provide the ex-
perimenter with a sample of alternatives spread enough over X so as to be in the capacity
of inferring aspects of the preference over alternatives not used in the experiments.
The subject’s behavior in the experiment is coded in a choice function. Formally, a
choice function of order k is a map c : Σk → 2B such that, for all Bi ∈ Σk, ∅ 6= c(Bi) ⊆ Bi.
It captures the observations of a subject who participates in finite experiment Σk. Let
Ck be the set of all choice functions of order k.
The behavior of a subject across the entire sequence of experiments is captured by the
choice sequence, defined as a function c : N→ ⋃k Ck such that for all k, ck ∈ Ck, and for
all k < l, cl(Bi) = c
k(Bi) for every Bi ∈ Σk. This last requirement conveys a consistency
of behavior across experiments: a subject responds in the same way to a binary choice,
no matter the experiment. We denote by C the set of all choice sequences. If, for two
choice sequences c and c′, it is the case that for all k and all Bi ∈ Σk, ck(Bi) ⊆ c′k(Bi),
then we write c v c′. Observe that, if c v c′, then ck(Bi) = c′k(Bi) except possibly when
c′k(Bi) = Bi = {xi, yi}, in which case we may have ck(Bi) = xi or ck(Bi) = yi. In words,
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we allow for c and c′ to be different and yet to be associated with observations of the
same subject, the key distinction being in how indifference is treated.
Of particular interest are choices that can be rationalized by a preference. Given a
preference , the choice function of order k generated by  is defined by
c(Bi) = arg max
Bi
{x ∈ Bi : x  y for all y ∈ Bi},
for Bi ∈ Σk. The choice sequence generated by  is defined analogously.
Thus, the choice sequence generated by the subject’s preference reflects both strict
comparisons as well as indifferences. In practice, however, the experimenter may not
be able to properly infer the indifference of the subject regarding two alternatives. The
difficulty arises, for example, when the experimenter offers the subject his preferred al-
ternative. In this case, the experimenter would typically require that the subject selects
only one of the two alternatives presented to him. Such situations, in which the experi-
menter cannot commit to being able to see all potentially chosen elements, are referred
to partial observability (Chambers et al., 2014), in contrast to full observability in which
the experimenter is able to elicit the subject’s indifference between alternatives.
To handle situations of partial observability as well as situations of full observability,
we discuss two notions of rationalization. The first notion is weak. It expresses the idea
that the experimenter is not willing to commit to interpreting observed choices as the
only potential choices made by the subject. For example, if the experimenter observes
that the subject chooses x when presented the pair {x, y}, she may not be willing to
infer that x ∗ y, as it may be that x ∼∗ y but the subject simply did not choose y.
This notion of weak rationalization is used, for example, by Afriat (1967) in the context
of consumer theory (for more details on this notion, see, for example, Chambers and
Echenique (2016)). Weak rationalization is formally defined as follows.
Definition 1. A preference  weakly rationalizes a choice function c of order k if c(Bi) ⊆
c(Bi) for all Bi ∈ Σk. A preference  weakly rationalizes a choice sequence c if c v c.
The second notion is a stronger one. It requires that the experimenter observes all
potential choices that can be made by the subject. It is closer in spirit to the notion used
in classical choice theory, and in particular, used in Richter (1966, 1971).
Definition 2. A preference  strongly rationalizes a choice function c of order k if
c(Bi) = c(Bi) for all Bi ∈ Σk. A preference  strongly rationalizes a choice sequence c
if c = c.
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A basic motivation for our analysis is the observation that, absent any discipline on
the rationalizing preferences, it is impossible to achieve desirable asymptotic properties
of the finite-experiment estimates. In fact, there always exists continuous and complete
rationalizing preferences that converge to the total indifference preference relation X×X,
the preference relation by which every alternative is indifferent to every other alternative.
Proposition 3. Let X = [a, b] ⊆ Rn, where a b, and let ∗ be a continuous preference
relation on X. There is a sequence {k} of continuous preference relations on X such
that, for each k, kstrongly rationalizes the choice function of order k generated by ∗,
and such that
k→ X ×X.
Proof. Denote by (a′, b′) the open interval {z ∈ Rn : a′  z  b′}. For each k, let
uk : ∪kl=1Bl → [0, 1] be a utility representation of ∗ on ∪kl=1Bl.
For each k, let {[ai, bi]}nki=1 be a sequence of intervals in Rn with the properties that
a) [a, b] ⊆ ∪nki=1[ai, bi], b) (ai, bi) ∩ (aj, bj) = ∅ for i 6= j, c) each element of ∪kl=1Bl is
contained in a set (ai, bi), and no two elements of ∪kl=1Bl are contained in the same, and
d) [ai, bi] is contained in some ball of radius (2k)
−1.3
For each interval [ai, bi] there is a continuous function fi such that f(x) = 0 for all
x ∈ [ai, bi] \ (ai, bi), f(x) = uk(x) if x ∈ (ai, bi) ∩ ∪kl=1Bl, sup{f(x) : x ∈ [ai, bi]} = 2 and
inf{f(x) : x ∈ [ai, bi]} = −2. Let u∗k : [a, b] → R be the function that coincides with fi
on each [ai, bi]. Let k be the preference relation represented by u∗k, and note that k
strongly rationalizes the choice function of order k generated by ∗, and is continuous.
Let x, y ∈ X. For each k, suppose that x ∈ [ai, bi] for the kth sequence of subintervals.
Let xk ∈ [ai, bi] be such that u∗k(xk) = 2. Note that ‖x − xk‖ < 1/k. Similarly, suppose
that y ∈ [aj, bj] for the kth sequence of subintervals and let yk ∈ [aj, bj] be such that
u∗k(yk) = −2. Then xk k yk. Since (xk, yk) → (x, y) and x, y ∈ X were arbitrary this
means that k→ X ×X.
3It is obvious that such a sequence exists. First, it is immediate that it exists for n = 1. For n > 1
project each Bk onto each of its coordinate and carry out the one-dimensional construction (choosing a
sufficiently small radius for the balls covering each interval). Then take the cartesian product of each
one-dimensional interval.
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Monotone Preferences
As discussed in the introduction, and exemplified by Proposition 3, the continuity as-
sumption on the subject’s preference, and the assumption that the alternatives offered
are in the limit dense, do not generally ensure convergence to the subject’s preference.
Proposition 3 shows that the failure of convergence can be rather dramatic. We must im-
pose structure on the subject’s preference, and on the finite-experiment rationalizations.
We focus on the monotonicity of preferences.
Monotonicity relates the subject’s preference to an objective, common taste across all
subjects being considered. Formally, we endow the space of alternatives X with a partial
order ≥, as a well as a strict order >, such that x > y implies x ≥ y. For example, >
may be the strict part of ≥ (but need not be; we may want to define > on Rn to be
the relation ). Writing x ≥ y is interpreted as “x is objectively at least as good as
y”, and x > y as “x is objectively strictly better than y.” The partial order ≥ is an
exogenous order. It depends on the application and the set of alternatives. For example,
it may take the form of vector dominance in commodity space, or first order stochastic
dominance over a set of lotteries.
The notion of monotonicity states that a preference should agree with the exogenous
order. We distinguish between the weak and strict form of monotonicity.
Definition 4. A preference  is weakly monotone if x ≥ y implies that x  y. A
preference  is strictly monotone if x > y implies that x  y.
Observe that the preferences k constructed in Proposition 3 cannot be monotone.
Suppose that ∗ is a continuous preference relation, and suppose that x ∗ y. In the
construction in Proposition 3 we obtain a sequence of rationalizations k such that in
the limit y is at least as good as x. This cannot happen if each rationalizing preference is
weakly monotone: x ∗ y implies that x′ ∗ y′ for (x′, y′) close enough to (x, y). Thanks
to the interaction of the order and the topology on Rn we can find a k large enough such
that there are {x′′, y′′} ∈ Σk (meaning alternatives offered in the kth finite experiment)
with x′ ≥ x′′ and y′′ ≥ y′, and where (x′′, y′′) is also close to (x, y). If k is monotone
then we have x′ k x′′ and y′′  y′. But if k strongly rationalizes the choices made at
the kth experiment, then x′′ k y′′. So we have to have x′ k y′ for any (x′, y′) close
enough to (x, y).
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Convergence of Preferences
To speak about the approximation of the subject’s preference, one must introduce a no-
tion of convergence on the space of preferences. We use closed convergence, and endow
the space of preference relations with the associated topology. The use of closed conver-
gence for preference relations was initiated by the work of Kannai (1970) and Hildenbrand
(1970), and has become standard since then.
One primary reason to adopt closed convergence is to capture the property that agents
with similar preferences should have similar choice behavior—a property that is necessary
to be able to learn the preference from finite data. Specifically, under the assumptions
we use for most of our results, the topology of closed convergence is the smallest topology
for which the sets
{(x, y,) : x  y}
are open (see Kannai (1970) Theorem 3.1). The desired continuity of choice behavior is
expressed by the fact that sets of the form {(x, y,) : x  y} are open. The topology of
closed convergence being the smallest topology with this property is a natural reason for
adopting it.
The following characterization of closed convergence for the context of preference
relations is useful:
Lemma 5. Let n be a sequence of preference relation, and let  be a preference relation.
Then n→ in the topology of closed convergence if and only if, for all x, y ∈ X,
1. x  y implies that for any neighborhood V of (x, y) in X ×X there is N such that
for all n ≥ N , n ∩V 6= ∅;
2. if, for any neighborhood V of (x, y) in X × X, and any N there is n ≥ N with
n ∩V 6= ∅, then x  y.
The following lemma plays an important role in the approximation results.
Lemma 6. The set of all continuous binary relations on X, endowed with the topology
of closed convergence, is a compact metrizable space.
Proof. See Theorem 2 (Chapter B) of Hildenbrand (2015), or Corollary 3.95 of Aliprantis
and Border (2006).
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In particular, we shall denote the metric which generates the closed convergence
topology by δC . Recall that X is metrizable, say with metric d. When X is compact,
one can choose δC to be the Hausdorff metric on subsets of X × X induced by d. On
the other hand, if X is only locally compact, then δC may be chosen to coincide with the
Hausdorff metric on subsets of X∞ × X∞, where X∞ is the one-point compactification
of X together with some metric generating X∞. See Aliprantis and Border (2006) for
details.
3 Application: Anscombe-Aumann Preferences over
monetary lotteries.
Let Ω be a finite nonempty set of states of the world. Let ∆([a, b]) be the set of all
Borel probability measures over the closed interval [a, b] ⊆ R. We interpret [a, b] as a set
of monetary payoffs, and the elements of ∆([a, b]) as lotteries of monetary payoffs. An
Anscombe-Aumann act is a state-contingent monetary lottery, it maps elements from Ω
to ∆([a, b]). Let the set of alternatives X be the set ∆([a, b])Ω of all Anscombe-Aumann
acts.
Endow X with the product weak* topology, and consider the partial order on X ob-
tained as the product of the first-order stochastic dominance order on ∆([a, b]). Formally,
we write x ≥ y if, for any ω ∈ Ω, x(ω) ≥FOSD y(ω).
Then, the following result obtains.
Theorem 7. Suppose ∗ is a strictly monotone preference relation. For every k =
1, 2, . . . , let k be a strictly monotone preference relation which strongly rationalizes the
choice function of order k generated by ∗. Then
• k→∗ (in the topology of closed convergence);
• for any utility representation u∗ of ∗, there exist utility representations uk of k
such that uk → u∗ (in the topology of compact convergence).
Theorem 7 is interesting for what it says, but also for what it does not say.
The theorem says that, if we assume that the data are generated by a (well behaved)
preference ∗, then any “finite sample rationalization” k is guaranteed to converge
to the generating preference. So estimates have the correct “large sample” properties.
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In particular, one may be interested in a specific theory of choice, such as max-min or
Choquet expected utility. So if the subject’s ∗ is max-min, or Choquet, one can choose
rationalizing preferences to conform to the theory, and the limit will uniquely identify
the subject’s max-min, or Choquet, preference. But if one incorrectly uses rationalizing
preferences outside of the theory, the asymptotic behavior will still correct the problem
and uniquely identify ∗ in the limit. The theorem also says that there are certain utility
representations uk that will be correct asymptotically.
Note, however, what the theorem does not say. First, the estimates k are guaranteed
to converge to the generating preferences ∗, when the generating preference is known
to exist. If one simply estimates the preferences k, these may fail to converge to a
well-behaved preference. We present two examples to this effect in Section 8. That
said, under certain conditions (that unfortunately are not satisfied in the Anscombe-
Aumann setting), the “size” of the set of rationalizing preferences shrinks as k growth;
see Theorem 10.
Second, Theorem 7 does not say that one can choose uk arbitrarily. Any estimated
rationalizing preference will converge to the preferences rationalizing the utility, but
basing the estimation on utilities is more complicated because it is not clear that any
utility representation of ∗ will have the right limit, or even converge at all.
This brings us to the role of identification theorems in decision theory. It is common
to show that a model is identified, and argue that this enables the empirical recovery
of utility parameters from observed behavior. The ideas behind Theorem 7 imply that
more is required. Specifically, suppose that U is the set of all continuous and strictly
monotone functions u : X → R. Denoting by Rmon the set of all continuous and strictly
monotone preference relations, let Φ : U → Rmon be the function that sends each u ∈ U
into the preference it represents. When we show that Φ is an open map (Theorem 19),
we show that k→∗ and u∗ ∈ Φ−1(∗) imply that one can choose uk ∈ Φ−1(k) with
uk → u∗.4 In fact, we show that if ' is the equivalence relation on U whereby two utility
functions are equivalent if they are ordinally equivalent (i.e., u ' u′ iff Φ(u) = Φ(u′)),
then Φ : U/ '→ Rmon is a homeomorphism (Theorem 21).
Many results on identification in decision theory can be phrased in the following terms.
There are subsets U ′ ⊆ U and R′ ⊆ Rmon, and an equivalence relation '′ on U ′ such
that Φ is a bijection from U ′/ '′ onto R′. Our results suggest that this is not enough to
4The property of being an open map is close to being necessary for the result: see Theorem 4.2 of
Siwiec (1971).
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conclude that empirical estimates will have the correct “large-sample behavior.”
4 Main Results
In this section, we present our results on the asymptotic behavior of preference estimates
based on finite data.
For our first result, we must define two notions. We say that a preference relation 
is locally strict if for every x, y ∈ X with x  y, and every neighborhood V of (x, y) in
X×X there is (x′, y′) ∈ V with x′  y′. We say that the order > on X has open intervals
if {(x, y) : x > y} is an open subset of X ×X. Our first main result gives conditions of
convergence of preferences that weakly rationalize the experimental observations.
Theorem 8. Suppose that
1. the subject’s preference ∗ is continuous and strictly monotone,
2. the strict order < has open intervals,
3. every continuous and strictly monotone preference relation is locally strict.
Let c v c∗ be a choice sequence, and let k be a continuous and strictly monotone
preference that weakly rationalizes ck. Then, k→∗ in the closed convergence topology.
Remark 9. The assumption that ∗ and k are transitive is not needed. Instead, each
of these only needs to be continuous, strictly monotone, and complete.
Theorem 8 requires the existence of ∗. However, even if existence of this object is
not supposed, we can still “bound” the set of rationalizations to an arbitrary degree of
precision. This is the content of the next result.
For a choice sequence c, let Pk(c) be the set of continuous and strictly monotone
preferences that weakly rationalize ck. For a set of binary relations S, define diam(S) =
sup(,′)∈S2 δC(,′) to be the diameter of S according to the metric δC which generates
the topology on preferences.
Theorem 10. Suppose that < has open intervals. Let c be a choice sequence, and suppose
that each strictly monotone continuous preference is also locally strict. Then one of the
following holds:
1. There is k such that Pk(c) = ∅.
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2. limk→∞ diam(Pk(c))→ 0.
That is, either a choice sequence is eventually not weakly rationalizable by a strictly
monotone preference, or, the set of rationalizations becomes arbitrarily small.
Remark 11. As for Theorem 8, Theorem 10 can dispense with the notion of transitivity.
In this case, we would define Pk(c) to be the set of (potentially nontransitive) complete,
continuous, and strongly monotone relations weakly rationalizing ck.
Our second result applies to preferences that strongly rationalize the experimental
observations. To state the result, we define two other notions. We say that the set X,
together with the collection of finite experiments Σ∞, has the countable order property
if for each x ∈ X and each neighborhood V of x in X there is x′, x′′ ∈ B ∩ V with
x′ ≤ x ≤ x′′. We say that X has the squeezing property if for any convergent sequence
{xn}n in X, if xn → x∗ then there is an increasing sequence {x′n}n, and an a decreasing
sequence {x′′n}n, such that x′n ≤ xn ≤ x′′n, and limn→∞ x′n = x∗ = limn→∞ x′′n.
Theorem 12. Suppose that
1. the subject’s preference ∗ is weakly monotone,
2. (X,Σ∞) has the countable order property, and X the squeezing property.
Let k be a continuous and weakly monotone preference that strongly rationalizes the
choice function of order k generated by ∗. Then, k→∗ in the closed convergence
topology.
The countable order and squeezing properties are technical but not vacuous. Impor-
tantly, as stated below in Proposition 13, they are satisfied for two common cases of
interest, which allows us to obtain the first part of Theorem 7 as a direct consequence of
Theorem 12.
Proposition 13. If either
1. the set of alternatives X is Rn endowed with the order of weak vector dominance,
or
2. the set of alternatives X is ∆([a, b]) endowed with the order of weak first-order
stochastic dominance,
then X has the squeezing property, and there is Σ∞ such that (X,Σ∞) has the countable
order property.
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One key element behind the above two results is a natural order on the sets of possible
alternatives. Via monotonicity, the order adds structure to the families of preferences
under consideration. Crucially, the order also relates to the topology on the set X.
Section 3 applies Theorem 12 to preferences over Anscombe-Aumann acts. We can
obtain a similar result for other environments, in particular, for environments in which
the alternatives can be represented as vectors in some Euclidean space. We emphasize
three domains of applications: lotteries over a finite prize space, dated rewards, and
consumption bundles.
Example 14. First consider lotteries over a finite set of prizes. Let Π be a finite prize
space. The objects of choice are the elements of X = ∆(Π). Fix a strict ranking of the
elements of Π, and enumerate the elements of Π so that pi1 is ranked above pi2, which
is ranked above pi3, and so on. Then the elements of X can be ordered with respect
to first-order stochastic dominance: x is larger than y in this order if the probability of
each set {pi1, . . . , pik} is at least as large under x than under y, for all k = 1, . . . , |Π|. A
preference over X is monotone if it always prefer larger lotteries over smaller ones.5
Imagine choices generated by an expected utility preference ∗. The fact that ∗ is of
the expected utility family implies that there are rationalizing expected utility preference
k, for each finite experiment k. Then our theorems ensure that these converge to ∗. Of
course the same would be true of any (monotone and continuous) rationalizing preference:
any mode mis-specification would be corrected in the limit. Any arbitrary sequence of
rationalization has ∗ as its limit.
Example 15. In second place, we can apply our theory to intertemporal choice. Specifi-
cally to the choice of dated rewards (Fishburn and Rubinstein (1982)). The set of elements
of choice is R2+. A point (x, t) ∈ R2+ is interpreted as a monetary payment of x delivered
on date t. Endow R2+ with the order ≤i whereby (x, t) ≤i (x′, t′) if x ≤ x′ and t′ ≤ t.
Monotonicity of preferences means that more money earlier is preferred to less money
later.
Now one can postulate a preference ∗ such that (x′, t′) ∗ (x, t) iff δtv(x) ≤ δt′v(x′),
for some δ ∈ (0, 1) and a strictly increasing function v : R+ → R. This means that
∗ follows the exponential discounting model. Again, any finite experiment would be
rationalizable by exponential preference, and these would converge to the limiting ∗.
Example 16. Finally, the elements of choice can be consumption bundles in Rn. A
preference over such consumption bundles is monotone if it prefers larger bundles over
5The objective order on Π is not really needed in this case; see Example 23. The point of the example
is to illustrate Theorem 8.
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smaller ones. Imagine a preference ∗ represented by, say, a Cobb-Douglas utility. Finite
sample estimates would then converge to the preference ∗.
5 Identification of Utility Functions
In this section, we investigate the relation between preferences and utility. Preferences
remain topologized with the closed convergence topology. We study continuous utility
representations, and ask when the identification of a preference allows the identification
of a utility (or conversely). We show that if we endow the set of continuous utility
functions with the topology of uniform convergence on compacta, then convergence in
one sense is equivalent to convergence in the other. Formally, we establish that there
is a homeomorphism between the two spaces (when we identify two utility functions
representing the same preference relation).
Throughout this section, the space of possible alternatives X is connected (and re-
mains a locally compact Polish space, as described in our model). Connectedness is
imposed so that every continuous preference admits a continuous representation, as in
Debreu (1954).
We denote by U the set of strictly increasing and continuous utility functions on
X. Similarly, Rmon denotes the set of preferences which are strictly monotone and
continuous.
Suppose the existence of a set M ⊆ X, satisfying the following conditions:
• M has at least two distinct elements; M is connected and totally ordered by <. In
other words x, y ∈M and x 6= y implies x < y or y < x.
• For any m ∈M and any neighborhood U of m in X there is m,m ∈M , with
m ∈ [m,m] ⊆ U.
Moreover if m is not the largest element of M we can choose m such that m < m,
and if m is not the smallest element we can choose m such that m < m.
• Any bounded sequence in X is bounded by elements of M . That is, for any bounded
sequence {xn} there are m and m and k large so that m ≤ xn ≤ m.
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Let Φ : U → Rmon such that Φ(u) is the preference represented by u ∈ U .6
We provide two examples below, that demonstrate the property just mentioned for
the case of alternatives of the form X = ∆([a, b]) and X = ∆([a, b])n.
Example 17. Let X = ∆([a, b]) be the set of Borel probability distributions on a real
compact interval S = [a, b] ⊆ R. Endow X with the weak* topology and let ≤ be
first-order stochastic dominance. Observe that X is compact, metrizable, and separable
(Theorems 15.11 and 15.12 of Aliprantis and Border (2006)). Observe also that X has
the countable order property (see Lemma 32 in Appendix B).
Let < be the strict part of ≤. Identify S with degenerate probability distributions,
so that s ∈ S denotes the element of X that assigns probability 1 to {s}, say δs. Let
M = S. The relative topology on S coincides with the usual topology, so S is connected.
Note that a ≤ x ≤ b for any x ∈ X.
Let m ∈ M and U be a neighborhood of m in X. For each x ∈ X, let F x be the cdf
associated to x. Choose ε such that the ball Bε(m) (in the Levy metric) with center m
and radius ε is contained in U . Let ε′ < ε. Then if y ∈ [m− ε′,m+ ε′] we have that
F y(s− ε)− ε ≤ Fm−ε′(s− ε)− ε < 1 = Fm(s) if s− ε ≥ m− ε′
F y(s− ε)− ε ≤ Fm−ε′(s− ε)− ε = −ε < Fm(s) if s− ε < m− ε′
Similarly,
Fm(s) = 0 < Fm+ε(s+ ε) + ε ≤ F y(s+ ε) + ε if s+ ε ≤ m+ ε′
Fm(s) < 1 + ε = Fm+ε
′
(s+ ε) + ε ≤ F y(s+ ε) + ε if s+ ε > m+ ε′.
These inequalities mean that y ∈ Bε(m). Thus [m− ε′,m+ ε′] ⊆ U , as y was arbitrary.
Example 18. Let Ω be a nonempty set such that |Ω| < +∞. Suppose Ω represents
a set of states of the world. Then ∆([a, b])Ω, endowed with the product weak* topol-
ogy, and ordered by the product order, of Ω copies of first order stochastic dominance,
represents the set of Anscombe-Aumann acts, Anscombe and Aumann (1963). Let
S = {(δs, . . . , δs) : s ∈ [a, b]}; the constant acts whose outcomes are degenerate lot-
teries. Let M = S, as in the previous example; and all topological properties satisfied
there are also satisfied here.
6That is, x Φ(u) y if and only if u(x) ≥ u(y).
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The following generalizes results derived originally by Mas-Colell (1974), who worked
with Rn+.
Theorem 19. Φ is an open map.
Theorem 20. (Border and Segal (1994) Thm 8) Let (X, d) be a locally compact and
separable metric space and R be the space of continuous preference relations on X, en-
dowed with the topology of closed convergence. If u= Φ(u) is locally strict, then Φ is
continuous at u. If M has no isolated points, and Φ is continuous at u, then u is locally
strict.
Define an equivalence relation ' on U by u ' v if there exists ϕ : R → R strictly
increasing for which u = ϕ ◦ v. Then let U/ ' denote the set of equivalence classes of U
under ' endowed with the quotient topology; the equivalence class of u ∈ U is written
[u]. The map Φˆ : U/ '→ Rmon is defined in the natural way, via Φˆ([u]) = Φ(u).7
Theorem 21. Φˆ is a homeomorphism.
6 Non-monotone preferences and local strictness
In response to Section 8.1, we show how we can leverage compactness results from the
theory of functions to establish the existence of a rationalizing preference in the limit.
Let V be a compact set of continuous functions in the topology of compact convergence,
and let Φ(V) denote the image of V under Φ, so that Φ(u) is the preference represented
by u.
Theorem 22. Suppose V is compact, and that all ∈ Φ(V) are locally strict. Let c be a
choice sequence, and let k∈ V weakly rationalize ck. Then, there exists ∗∈ V such that
k→∗ in the closed convergence topology. Furthermore, if ′k also weakly rationalizes
ck, then ′k→∗.
Theorem 22 implies that one can some times obtain asymptotically obtain utility
rationalizations drawn from V . In particular, when V is compact, Φ(V) consists of locally
strict preferences, and Φ is a homeomorphism then Φ−1(k) ∈ V converges to a utility
for ∗ in V . One application of this kind is in Example 23.
Example 23. Let X be a finite set, and let ∆(X) be the lotteries on X (topologized as
elements of Euclidean space). Consider the set of nonconstant expected utility prefer-
ences. Then the hypotheses of Theorem 22 hold here. To see this, observe that the set
7Observe that this function is well-defined. If v ∈ [u], then there is strictly increasing ϕ for which
v = ϕ ◦ u, hence v and u represent the same preference.
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of nonconstant von Neumann-Morgenstern utility indices is homeomorphic to the set
S = {u ∈ RX :
∑
x
ux = 0, ‖u‖ = 1}.
It is straightforward to see that the map φ : S → C(∆(X)) given by φ(u)(p) =∑x uxp(x)
is continuous. So, let V = φ(S) which is compact; then the set Φ(V) is the set of
nontrivial expected utility preferences. Finally, observe that each nonconstant expected
utility preference is locally strict. For, if  is nonconstant, then there are p, q ∈ ∆(X)
for which p  q. Then for any r  s, for any α > 0, αp + (1 − α)r  αq + (1 − α)s.
Choose α small to be within any neighborhood of (r, s).
Next, Example 24 allows for an infinite set of prices, but restricts von Neumann-
Morgenstern utilities to have lower and upper Lipschitz bounds.
Example 24. We can consider Rn+, and a class of utility functions U ba, where a, b ∈ R
with 0 < a < b.
U ba = {u ∈ C(Rn+) : ∀i ∧ ∀(xi < yi), a(yi − xi) ≤ u(yi, x−i)− u(xi, x−i) ≤ b(yi − xi)}.
Observe that U ba ⊆ U , and consists of those members satisfying a certain Lipschitz
property (namely, Lipschitz boundedness above and below). By the Arzela-Ascoli The-
orem (see Dugundji (1966), Theorem 6.4), U ba is compact. Furthermore, each ∈ Φ(U ba)
is locally strict, as it is strictly monotonic.
7 Infinite and Countable Data
In this section, we propose two sufficient conditions that enable the recovery of the
subject’s preference from its restriction to a countable set of data points.
In the first result, we show that, if we can observe a subrelation of a locally strict and
continuous binary relation on a dense set, then we can infer the entire binary relation.
Theorem 25. Suppose that  and ′ are two complete and continuous binary relations.
Suppose that ′ is locally strict, and let B ⊆ X be dense. If  |B×B ⊆′ |B×B, then
=′.
The second result makes no restriction on the preferences other than continuity, but
requires the underlying space of alternatives to be connected.
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Theorem 26. Suppose that  and ′ are two continuous preference relations. Suppose
X is connected, and let B ⊆ X be dense. If  |B×B =′ |B×B, then =′.
A classical tool, attributed to Allais (see Allais (1953)) allows one to elicit multiple
choices with one suitably randomized choice. Roughly, one uses a randomization device
whose outcome is a choice set, and asks a subject to announce what she would choose
ex-ante from each of the sets in the support in the distribution. A decision maker who
respects basic monotonicity postulates (see Azrieli et al. (2014)) correctly announces each
of their choices.
If we can uncover an entire preference from each of these choices, then we are able
to elicit an entire preference using one suitably chosen random device. Here, we do not
investigate this theory in its full generality. But if there is a countable dense subset of
alternatives, and a continuous preference can be inferred from its behavior on a countable
dense subset, then we can utilize the Allais mechanism to uncover an entire preference
with a single randomized choice. For example, we would enumerate the pairs of elements
from the countable dense subset, say B1, B2, . . ., and randomize so that each one realizes
with probability 2−k.
8 On the meaning of ∗
Some economists are comfortable saying that an agent “has” a preference ∗, and some
are not. The first assume that the preference is something intrinsic to the agent, and that
when presented with a choice situation the agent can access his preference and choose
accordingly. The exercise in our paper gives conditions under which a finite experiment
can approximate, to an arbitrary degree of precision, the underlying preference that the
agent uses to make choices.
Other economists think that preferences are just choices. For people in this position,
it is meaningless to speak of a preference over pairs of alternatives from which the agent
never chooses. We are highly sympathetic to this view, and our paper also contributes
to this interpretation. Under the right conditions (conditions that we provide in our
paper) continuity “defines” preferences over X given choices over a countable subset.
This is important because estimated preference provide a guide for making normative
recommendations and out of sample predictions. An economist may want to estimate
∗ so as to make policy recommendations that are in the agent’s interest (in fact this is
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a very common use of estimated preferences in applied work). Similarly, the economist
may want to use ∗ as an input in a structural economic model, and thereby make
predictions for different configurations of the model. The existence and meaning of ∗
is then provided for by the continuity assumption.
Moreover, viewed from this angle, Theorem 10 allows us to say that the set of ratio-
nalizations can be made arbitrarily small as more and more data are observed.8 In this
manner, one can bound errors in welfare statements or out of sample predictions to an
arbitrary degree of precision.
We conclude this section with two examples that illustrate the importance of postu-
lating existence of an agent’s preference: without the postulate, the inferred preference
may otherwise fail to converge.
8.1 The set of weakly monotone preference relations is not
closed
Suppose we are interested in rationality in the form of a strictly monotonic continuous
preference relation. Observe that Theorems 8 and 12 hypothesize the existence of ∗. If
∗∈ Rmon, for example, then we know that, in the limit, rationalizing relations will be
transitive if every k is. Unfortunately, we show in this section, if we do not know that
∗ is transitive, we cannot ensure that it is, even if each k is. That is, we demonstrate
a sequence k of strictly monotone preferences, where k→∗ in the closed convergence
topology, but ∗ is not transitive.
The data are rationalizable, but the rationalization requires intransitive indifference.
So the properties of the rationalizations of order k cannot be preserved.
Figure 1 exhibits a non-transitive relation. The example is taken from Grodal (1974).
The lines depict indifference curves, but all the green indifference curves intersect at one
point: (1/2, 1/2). This makes the preference non-transitive; specifically the indifference
part of the preference would be intransitive here.
Now imagine a collection of binary comparisons that do not include (1/2, 1/2). Sup-
pose that this collection is the limit of a finite number of binary comparisons, making
8This is true in spite of Section 8.1. It is true that the set of rationalizations may “shrink” to
something which is not transitive, but this set is shrinking nonetheless and always contains preference
relations (except in the limit).
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1/2
1/2
1/2
1/2
Figure 1: A non-transitive preference
it at most countable. There must exist a ball around (1/2, 1/2) that does not include
any of the comparisons. Consider the diagram in Figure 2. The preferences have been
modified close to (1/2, 1/2) so that transitivity holds.
This example is not particularly troubling, however. First, with finite experimenta-
tion, the violation of transitivity will never be “reached.” Second, the violation here is
not particularly egregious. Only transitivity of indifference is violated. This holds quite
generally. It can be shown that any limit point of a sequence of preference relations must
be quasitransitive, so that whenever x  y and y  z, it follows that x  z.9 Qua-
sitransitive relations enjoy many of the useful properties of preferences. For example,
continuous quasitransitive relations possess maxima on compact sets, see e.g. Bergstrom
(1975).
8.2 The set of locally strict relations is not closed
Finally we present an example to show that the set of locally strict preference relations
is not closed. Let X = [−3,−1]∪ [1, 3]. For each n, let un(x) = −(x+2)2 + 1n on [−3,−1]
9The argument is in Grodal (1974), but to see this suppose that n→, where each n is a preference
relation. It can be shown that  is complete, so suppose by means of contradiction that there are
x, y, z ∈ X for which x  y, y  z, and z  x. So, there are xn, zn for which zn n xn, xn → x,
and zn → z. For each n, either zn n y or y n x, so that without loss, there is a sequence for which
zn n y, i.e. z  y, a contradiction.
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Figure 2: A transitive preference
Figure 3: The set of locally strict preferences is not closed.
and un(x) = (x − 2)2 − 1n on [1, 3]. See Figure 3. The function un represents a locally
strict relation n.
Let u∗(x) be the pointwise limit of un; i.e. u∗(x) = −(x + 2)2 on [−3,−1] and
u∗(x) = (x − 2)2 on [1, 3]. The function u∗ represents ∗ which is not locally strict.
Observe that −2 ∗ 2, but for small neighborhoods there is no strict preference.
However, it is also straightforward by checking cases to show that n→∗.
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Appendix A About Closed Convergence
We recall below the formal definition of closed convergence, used throughout the results
of this paper. Let F = {F n}n be a sequence of closed sets in X ×X. We define Li(F)
and Ls(F) to be closed subsets of X ×X as follows:
• (x, y) ∈ Li(F) if and only if, for all neighborhood V of (x, y), there exists N ∈ N
such that F n ∩ V 6= ∅ for all n ≥ N .
• (x, y) ∈ Ls(F) if and only if, for all neighborhood V of (x, y), and all N ∈ N, there
is n ≥ N such that F n ∩ V 6= ∅.
Observe that Li(F) ⊆ Ls(F). The definition of closed convergence is as follows.
Definition 27. F n converges to F in the topology of closed convergence if Li(F) = F =
Ls(F).
Appendix B Proof of Proposition 13
The proof is implied by the following lemmas.
Lemma 28. Let X ⊆ Rn. If {x′n} is an increasing sequence in X, and {x′′n} is a
decreasing sequence, such that sup{x′n : n ≥ 1} = x∗ = inf{x′′n : n ≥ 1}. Then
lim
n→∞
x′n = x
∗ = lim
n→∞
x′′n.
Proof. This is obvously true for n = 1. For n > 1, convergence and sups and infs are
obtained component-by-component, so the result follows.
Lemma 29. Let X ⊆ Rn. Let {xn} be a convergent sequence in X, with xn → x∗.
Then there is an increasing sequence {x′n} and an a decreasing sequence {x′′n} such that
x′n ≤ xn ≤ x′′n, and limn→∞ x′n = x∗ = limn→∞ x′′n.
Proof. Suppose that xn → x∗. Define x′n and x′′n by
x′n = inf{xm : n ≤ m} and x′′n = sup{xm : n ≤ m}
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Then it is clear that x′n ≤ xn ≤ x′′n, that x′n is increasing, and that x′′n is decreasing.
Moreover,
lim
n→∞
x′n = sup{inf{xm : n ≤ m} : n ≥ 1}
= x∗
= inf{sup{xm : n ≤ m} : n ≥ 1} = lim
n→∞
x′′n
by Lemma 28.
Lemma 30. Let X = ∆([a, b]). Let {xn} be a convergent sequence in X, with xn → x∗.
Then there is an increasing sequence {x′n} and an a decreasing sequence {x′′n} such that
x′n ≤ xn ≤ x′′n, and limn→∞ x′n = x∗ = limn→∞ x′′n.
Proof. The set X ordered by first order stochastic dominance is a complete lattice (see,
for example, Lemma 3.1 in Kertz and Ro¨sler (2000)). Suppose that xn → x∗. Define
x′n and x
′′
n by x
′
n = inf{xm : n ≤ m} and x′′n = sup{xm : n ≤ m}. Clearly, {x′n} is an
increasing sequence, {x′′n} is decreasing, and x′n ≤ xn ≤ x′′n.
Let Fx denote the cdf associated with x. Note that Fx′′n(r) = inf{Fxm(r) : n ≤ m}
while Fx′n(r) is the right-continuous modification of sup{Fxm(r) : n ≤ m}. For any point
of continuity r of F , Fxm(r)→ Fx∗(r), so
Fx(r) = sup{inf{Fxm(r) : n ≤ m} : n ≥ 1}
by Lemma 28.
Moreover, Fx∗(r) = inf{sup{Fxm(r) : n ≤ m} : n ≥ 1}. Let ε > 0. Then
Fx∗(r−ε)← sup{Fxm(r−ε) : n ≤ m} ≤ Fx′n(r) ≤ sup{Fxm(r+ε) : n ≤ m} → Fx∗(r+ε)
Then Fx′n(r)→ Fx∗(r), as r is a point of continuity of Fx∗ .
The following lemma is immediate.
Lemma 31. Let X = Rn+ with the standard vector order ≤, and let B = Qn+. Then the
countable order property is satisfied.
Our last lemma is a direct implication of Theorem 15.11 of Aliprantis and Border
(2006).
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Lemma 32. Let a, b ∈ R, where a < b. Let X = ∆([a, b]), the set of Borel probability
distributions on [a, b] endowed with the weak* topology. Let B be the set of probability
distributions p with finite support on Q ∩ [a, b], where for all q ∈ Q ∩ [a, b], p(q) ∈ Q.
Then the countable order property is satisfied.
Appendix C Proof of Theorems 8, 25, 26 and 10
In this section, we let Rmon denote the set of complete, continuous, and strictly mono-
tonic binary relations. Members of Rmon need not be transitive. Likewise, Rls is the
set of complete, continuous, and locally strict binary relations.
We record the following facts:
Lemma 33. Let  be a continuous binary relation. If x  y then there are neighborhoods
Vx of x and Vy of y such that x
′  y′ for all x′ ∈ Vx and y′ ∈ Vy.
Theorem 34. Suppose that  and ′ are two complete and continuous binary relations.
Suppose that ′ is locally strict, and let B ⊆ X be dense. If  |B×B ⊆′ |B×B, then
⊆′.
Proof. Suppose by means of contradiction that there are x, y such that x ′ y but x  y
is false. Then y  x, as  is complete, and x ∼′ y as y  x implies y ′ x. Let U be a
neighborhood of (y, x) so that for all (y′, x′) ∈ U , we have y′  x′. By local strictness,
let (y∗, x∗) ∈ U for which x∗ ′ y∗. Then y∗  x∗ as well. Now let V be a neighborhood
of (x∗, y∗) for which for all (x′, y′) ∈ V , y′  x′ and x′  y′. Choose (xˆ, yˆ) ∈ V ∩ (B×B)
and observe that we have a contradiction.
Theorem 35. Suppose that  and ∗ are complete and continuous binary relations.
Suppose that ∗ is locally strict. If ⊆∗, then =∗.
Proof. Suppose by means of contradiction that there is (x, y) such that x ∗ y but x  y
is false. Conclude that y  x, so that y ∗ x (and hence x ∼∗ y) and y  x. Let U be
a neighborhood about (x, y) for which for all (x′, y′) ∈ U , y′  x′ (Lemma 33). By local
strictness, there is (x∗, y∗) ∈ U such that x∗ ∗ y∗. Hence we have x∗ ∗ y∗ and y∗  x∗,
contradicting ⊆∗.
We now prove Theorems 25 and 26.
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Proof of Theorem 25. The proof follows directly from Theorems 34 and 35.
Proof of Theorem 26. First, it is straightforward to show that x  y implies x ′ y.
Because otherwise there are x, y for which x  y and y ′ x. Take an open neighborhood
U about (x, y) and a pair (z, w) ∈ U∩(B×B) for which z  w and w ′ z, a contradiction.
Symmetrically, we also have x ′ y implies x  y.
Now, without loss, suppose that there is a pair x, y for which x  y and x ∼′ y. By
connectedness and continuity, V = {z : x  z  y} is nonempty and by continuity it
is open.10 We claim that there is a pair (w, z) ∈ (V × V ) ∩ (B × B) for which w  z.
For otherwise, for all (w, z) ∈ V × V ∩ (B × B), w ∼ z. Conclude then by continuity
that for all (w, z) ∈ V × V , w ∼ z. Observe that this implies that, for any w ∈ V ,
the set {z : w  z  y} = ∅, as if w  z  y, we also have that x  w  z, from
which we conclude x  z, so that z ∈ V and hence z ∼ w, a contradiction. Observe that
{z : w  z  y} = ∅ contradicts the continuity of  and the connectedness of X (same
argument as nonemptyness of V ; see the footnote).
We have shown that there is (w, z) ∈ (V × V ) ∩ (B × B) for which w  z, so that
x  w  z  y. Further, we have hypothesized that x ∼′ y. By the first paragraph, we
know that x ′ w ′ z ′ y. If, by means of contradiction, we have w ′ z, then x ′ y,
a contradiction. So w ∼′ z and w  z, a contradiction to B×B=′B×B.
Lemma 36. Let A ⊆ X × X. Then {: A ⊆} is closed in the closed convergence
topology.
Proof. Let n be a convergent sequence in the set in question, where n→. Then for
all (x, y) ∈ A, we have x n y, hence x  y. So (x, y) ∈.
Lemma 37. Suppose X is locally compact Polish, and that < has open intervals. Then
Rmon is closed in the topology of closed convergence.
Proof. By Lemma 6, since X is locally compact Polish, the topology of closed convergence
is compact metrizable.
10The argument for nonemptiness is as follows. If, by means of contradiction, V = ∅, then {z : x  z}
and {z : z  y} are nonempty open sets. Further, for any z ∈ X, either x  z or z  y (because if
¬(x  z) then by completeness z  x, which implies that z  y). Conclude that {z : x  z} ∪ {z : z 
y} = X and each of the sets are nonempty and open (by continuity); these sets are disjoint, violating
connectedness of X.
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Suppose n→ where each n is continuous, strictly monotonic, and complete. We
know that  is continuous by compactness. Suppose by means of contradiction that 
is not strictly monotonic, so that there are x, y ∈ X for which x > y and y  x. Then
there are (xn, yn) → (x, y) for which yn n xn. For n large, xn > yn, a contradiction
to the fact that n is strictly monotonic. Finally, completeness follows as for each x, y,
either x n y or y n x, so there is a subsequence nk for which either x nk y or for
which y nk x.
Lemma 38. Suppose that B is dense, ′ is complete, and each of  and ∗ are contin-
uous and locally strict complete relations. Then if
′ |B×B ⊆∗ |B×B∩  |B×B,
it follows that ∗=.
Proof. Suppose, by means of contradiction and without loss of generality, that there are
x, y ∈ X for which x ∗ y and y  x. By continuity of and local strictness of∗, we can
without loss of generality assume that x ∗ y and y  x. By continuity of each of  and
∗, there exists a, b ∈ B such that a ∗ b and b  a. But by completeness of ′, either
a ′ b, contradicting ′ |B×B ⊆ |B×B, or b ′ a, contradicting ′ |B×B ⊆∗ |B×B.
We now turn to the main proof of the theorem.
Proof of Theorem 8. By Lemma 37, Rmon is compact. Let ′ be any strictly monotonic
and complete binary relation such that for all k and all {x, y} ∈ Σk, x ∈ ck({x, y}) if and
only if x ′ y (′ exists by the projection requirement on choice sequences, and by the
fact that c v c∗).
For each k, let ′k= {(x, y) : {x, y} ∈ {B1, . . . , Bk} and x ′ y}.
For each k, let
Pk = {∈ Rmon :′k⊆},
the set of relations which weakly rationalize c. Observe by definition that by Lemma 36,
Pk is closed, and hence compact. By assumption, each ∈ Pk satisfies ∈ Rls, and
obviously, for all k, ∗∈ Pk. Further, observe that
⋂
k Pk = {∗}, since if ∈
⋂
k Pk, by
definition ′B×B⊆∗ |B×B∩  |B×B and Lemma 38.
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The result now follows as each Pi is compact and
⋂
k Pk = {∗}. That is, let k∈ Pk,
which is a decreasing, nested collection of compact sets. Suppose by means of contradic-
tion and without loss that k→′ 6=∗, and observe then that it follows that ′∈ Pk for
all k, contradicting
⋂
i Pi = {∗}.
Proof of Theorem 10. Observe that for any k, the set
Pk = {∈ Rmon : weakly rationalizes ck}
is closed, and hence compact by Lemma 36. Observe that Pk(c) ⊆ Pk. Moreover, it is
obvious that Pk+1 ⊆ Pk. Suppose that there is no k for which Pk(c) = ∅. Then, since
each Pk 6= ∅ and each Pk is compact,
⋂
k Pk 6= ∅. Let ∗∈
⋂
k Pk.
We claim that
⋂
k Pk = {∗}. Suppose by means of contradiction that there is 6=∗
where ∈ ⋂k Pk. Let ′ be any complete relation such that for all (a, b) ∈ B×B, a ′ b
if and only if a ∈ ck({a, b}), for k such that {a, b} ∈ Σk. Then, by definition of weak
rationalization, we have ′B×B⊆B×B ∩ ∗B×B. Appeal to Lemma 38 to conclude that
=∗, a contradiction.
Finally, since
⋂
k Pk = {∗}, and each Pk is compact, it follows that limk→∞ diam(Pk)→
0.11 Hence, since 0 ≤ diam(Pk(c)) ≤ diam(Pk), the result follows.
Appendix D Proof of Theorem 12
The set of weakly monotone and continuous binary relations is compact in the topology of
closed convergence. Suppose wlog that k→. Then  is a continuous binary relation.
We shall prove that =∗.
First we show that x ∗ y implies that x  y. So let x ∗ y. Let U and V be
neighborhoods of x and y, respectively, such that x′ ∗ y′ for all x′ ∈ U and y′ ∈ V .
Such neighborhoods exist by the continuity of ∗. We prove first that if (x′, y′) ∈ U ×V ,
then there existsN such that x′ n y′ for all n ≥ N . By hypothesis, there exist x′′ ∈ U∩B
and y′′ ∈ U ∩B such that x′′ ≤ x′ and y′ ≤ y′′. Each n is a strong rationalization of the
11Otherwise, we could choose  > 0 and two subsequences kl ,′kl such that δC(kl ,′kl) ≥  andkl→∈
⋂
k Pk and ′kl→′∈
⋂
k Pk where δC(,′) ≥ , a contradiction.
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finite experiment of order n, so if {x˜, y˜} ∈ Σn then x˜ n y˜ implies that x˜ m y˜ for all
m ≥ n. Since x′′, y′′ ∈ B, there is N is such that {x′′, y′′} ∈ ΣN . Thus x′′ ∗ y′′ implies
that x′′ n y′′ for all n ≥ N . So, for n ≥ N , x′ n y′, as n is weakly weakly monotone.
Now we establish that x  y. Let {(xn, yn)} be an arbitrary sequence with (xn, yn)→
(x, y). By hypothesis, there is an increasing sequence {x′n}, and a decreasing sequence
{y′n}, such that x′n ≤ xn and yn ≤ y′n while (x, y) = limn→∞(x′n, y′n).
Let N be large enough that x′N ∈ U and y′N ∈ V . Let N ′ ≥ N be such that x′N n y′N
for all n ≥ N ′ (we established the existence of such N ′ above). Then, for any n ≥ N ′ we
have that
xn ≥ x′n ≥ x′N n y′N ≥ y′n ≥ yn.
By the weak monotonicity of n, then, xn n yn. The sequence {(xn, yn)} was arbitrary,
so (y, x) /∈= limn→∞ n. Thus ¬(y  x). Completeness of  implies that x  y.
In second place we show that if x ∗ y then x  y, thus completing the proof. So let
x ∗ y. For any k ≥ 1, choose x′ ∈ Nx(1/k)∩B with x′ ≥ x, and y′ ∈ Ny(1/k)∩B with
y′ ≤ y; so that x′ ∗ x ∗ y ∗ y′, as ∗ is weakly weakly monotone. Recall that n↑.
So x′ ∗ y′ and x′, y′ ∈ B imply that x′ n y′ for all n large enough. Let nk ≥ nk−1 such
that x′ nk y′; and let x′ = xnk and y′ = ynk .
Then we have (xnk , ynk)→ (x, y) and xnk nk ynk . Thus x  y.
Appendix E Proof of Theorem 19
We begin with two useful lemmas.
Lemma 39. Φ is an open map if for any u∗ ∈ U and any sequence n in R with
n→ Φ(u∗), there is a sequence {un} in U such that un ∈ Φ−1(n) and un → u∗ in the
topology of compact convergence.
Proof. Suppose that there is V ⊆ U open, but Φ(V ) is not open. Then there is u∗ ∈ V
and n /∈ Φ(V ) such that n→ Φ(u∗) (since closed convergence topology is metrizable).
Since u∗ ∈ V , any sequence un ∈ Φ−1(n) for which un → u∗ eventually has un ∈ V .
But if un is chosen to represent n, this implies that Φ(un) ∈ Φ(V ) for n large, a
contradiction.
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Lemma 40. For any  and x ∈ X, there is a unique m∗(x) ∈ M with x ∼ m∗(x).
Moreover, if we fix u ∈ U then the function u : X → R defined by u(x) = u(m∗(x)) is
a continuous utility representation of .
Proof. Consider the sets A = {m ∈ M : m  x} and B = {m ∈ M : x  m}. These
sets are closed because  is continuous, their union is M as  is complete, and they
are nonempty as  is monotone and there exist m,m ∈ M with m ≤ x ≤ m by our
hypothesis on M . M is connected, so A and B cannot be disjoint; hence there is m ∈M
with x ∼ m. This m must be unique because M is totally ordered, and  is strictly
monotone.
We now show that u is a continuous utility representation of . Let x  y.
Then transitivity and monotonicity of  imply that m∗(x) ≥ m∗(y). Thus u(x) =
u∗(m∗(x)) ≥ u∗(m∗(y)) = u(y). The converse implications hold as well; thus u repre-
sents .
To prove continuity, let xn → x∗. We shall prove that mn = m∗(xn)→ m∗(x∗) = mˆ.
Suppose first that mˆ is not the largest or the least element ofM . For each neighborhood U
of mˆ there exists, by our hypothesis on M , m,m ∈M with m < mˆ < m and [m,m] ⊆ U .
Then
V = {z ∈ X : m  z} ∩ {z ∈ X : z  m}
is a neighborhood of x∗, as x∗ ∼ mˆ and  is continuous and monotone. For large enough
n then xn ∈ V , so mn ∈ [m,m] ⊆ U . Suppose now that mˆ is the largest element of
M . Then, reasoning as above, xn ∈ {z ∈ X : z  m} for all large enough n, so that
m ≤ mn. We have mn ≤ m as m is the largest element of M . Thus mn ∈ [m,m] ⊆ U .
The argument when m is the least element of M is analogous.
We now turn to the main proof of the theorem.
Proof of Theorem 19. Let u∗ ∈ U and {n} be a sequence in R with n→ Φ(u∗). By
Lemma 39 it is enough to exhibit a sequence un ∈ Φ−1(n) and un → u∗ in the topology
of compact convergence.
Let un = un as defined in Lemma 40 from u
∗. Lemma 40 implies that un ∈ Φ−1(n).
By XII Theorem 7.5 p. 268 of Dugundji (1966), to establish compact convergence it is
enough to show that for any convergent sequence {xn}, with xn → x∗, un(xn)→ u∗(x∗).
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To this end, let xn → x∗. Let mˆ = m∗(x∗) and mn ∼n xn, using the notation in
Lemma 40, and U be a neighborhood of mˆ. Let m,m ∈M be such that m < mˆ < m and
[m,m] ⊆ U . Then it must be true that mn ∈ [m,m] for all n large enough. To see this,
note that if, for example, mn ≥ m infinitely often then there would exist a subsequence
for which xn n mn  m (by monotonicity of ), which would imply that x∗  m > mˆ,
as n→. But mˆ ∼ x∗  m is a violation of monotonicity.
Now mn ∈ [m,m] ⊆ U for all n large enough means that mn → mˆ. Thus
un(xn) = u
∗(xn)→ u∗(x∗) = u(x∗),
as u∗ is continuous.
Appendix F Proof of Theorem 22
By Theorem 8 of Border and Segal (1994), Φ(V) is compact, and therefore k possesses a
limit point ∗∈ Φ(V). By Lemma 36, the set of k weakly rationalizing ck is closed, and
hence compact. Suppose by means of contradiction that there is some ′k also weakly
rationalizing ck which converges to 6=∗. Observe that each of ∗ and  weakly
rationalize each ck.
Finally, let ′ be any complete relation such that for all (a, b) ∈ B × B, a ′ b if
and only if a ∈ ck({a, b}), for k such that {a, b} ∈ Σk. Then, by definition of weak
rationalization, we have ′B×B⊆B×B ∩ ∗B×B. Appeal then to Lemma 38 to conclude
that =∗, a contradiction.
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